The effect of retirement on political shirking: Evidence from congressional voting

David N. Figlio*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

The theory of rational utility-maximizing agents suggests that politicians should alter their voting patterns when the reelection constraint is removed. However, the previous empirical work on this issue has not shown such a relationship. This article tests the hypothesis that the decision to retire results in systematic changes in political voting behavior (or “political shirking”). The author uses a multiyearpanel data set with more observations than many prior studies, a more precise measure of political shirking, and a different measure of retirement than previous work Least squares estimation yields significant coefficient estimates and substantial evidence that the retirement decision results in political shirking.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)226-241
Number of pages16
JournalPublic Finance Review
Volume23
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1995

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Public Administration

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