Abstract
The corporate information environment develops endogenously as a consequence of information asymmetries and agency problems between investors, entrepreneurs, and managers. We review current research on the three main decisions that shape the corporate information environment in capital market settings: (1) managers' voluntary disclosure decisions, (2) disclosures mandated by regulators, and (3) reporting decisions by analysts. We conclude that, in the last ten years, research has generated several useful insights. Despite this progress, we call for researchers to consider interdependencies between the various decisions that shape the corporate information environment and suggest new and interesting issues for researchers to address.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 296-343 |
Number of pages | 48 |
Journal | Journal of Accounting and Economics |
Volume | 50 |
Issue number | 2-3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2010 |
Funding
We thank Philip Berger (discussant), Ronald Dye, Ilan Guttman, Margaret Neale, Ulf Schiller, Ron Shalev, Ross Watts (editor), Jerold Zimmerman (editor), and participants at the 2009 Journal of Accounting and Economics conference for helpful comments and discussions. We appreciate the financial support from Stanford University, New York University, and the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University.
Keywords
- Analysts
- Information environment
- Mandatory disclosures
- Regulation
- Voluntary disclosures
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics