The “fixed” pie perception and strategy in dyadic versus multiparty negotiations

Mary C. Kern*, Jeanne M. Brett, Laurie R. Weingart, Chase S. Eck

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Mixed-motive negotiations are strategically, socially, and motivationally complex. Theorists argue that multiparty negotiations exacerbate these complexities leading to inefficient outcomes. In contrast, we propose that multiparty negotiators respond to the complexities of their negotiation context by using strategy differently than dyadic negotiators and that one reason why is that they arrive at the negotiation table with weaker fixed pie perceptions than dyadic negotiators. Results across three studies showed that multiparty negotiators had weaker fixed pie perceptions compared to dyadic negotiators. Multiparty negotiators also engaged in more integrative strategic behavior and used more complex complementary and structural sequences of behavior than dyadic negotiators. These differences in use of strategy helped multiparty negotiators achieve Pareto efficient outcomes equal to those of dyads. To obtain a conservative estimate of the effect size of context on fixed pie perceptions, we conducted an internal meta-analysis of our file drawer.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)143-158
Number of pages16
JournalOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Volume157
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2020

Keywords

  • Dyad
  • Fixed pie
  • Multiparty
  • Negotiation
  • Reciprocity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Applied Psychology
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

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