Abstract
The political ideal of neutrality toward conceptions of the good is unsustainable at the extremely abstract level proposed by some liberal theorists. Neutrality is nonetheless a valuable political ideal. One of the many ways that government can go wrong is to take a position on some question that it would, all things considered, be better for it to abstain from deciding. The classic example is the question of which (if any) religion is true. The idea of neutrality holds that government ought to avoid this pathology.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 633-648 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Review of Politics |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2004 |
Funding
Thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Ron Allen, Cynthia Bowman, Robert Burns, Steven Calabresi, Anthony D'Amato, John Deigh, Peter De Marneffe, Chad Flanders, Kent Greenawalt, Philip Hamburger, Bonnie Honig, George Kateb, Charles Larmore, Douglas Laycock, Sarah Lively, Valerie Quinn, Joseph Raz, Martin Redish, Jack Schillaci, Steven D. Smith, Charles Taylor, Kim Yuracko, Jeremy Waldron, and the participants in the Columbia University School of Law Legal Theory Workshop, the Rutgers-Camden School of Law Faculty Seminar, the University of Chicago Political Theory Workshop, and the U.C.L.A Faculty Colloquium for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts, to Robert P. George and Melvin Gilbert for enlightening conversations on this subject, and to Marcia Lehr for valuable research assistance. My largest debt is to Bruce Ackerman, with whom I have been arguing about these matters for years. This research was supported by Northwestern University School of Law Summer Faculty Research Program and the Kathleen M. Haight Fund.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations