The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring

Johannes Hörner*, Wojciech Olszewski

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

47 Scopus citations

Abstract

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1499-1544
Number of pages46
JournalEconometrica
Volume74
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2006

Keywords

  • Folk theorem
  • Private monitoring
  • Repeated games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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