The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring

Johannes Hörner; Wojciech Olszewski

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00717.x

The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring

Johannes Hörner^*, Wojciech Olszewski

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

54 Scopus citations

Abstract

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1499-1544
Number of pages	46
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	74
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00717.x
State	Published - Nov 2006

Keywords

Folk theorem
Private monitoring
Repeated games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00717.x

Cite this

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abstract = "We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device.",

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AB - We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device.

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The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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