The formation of blocs in an experimental study of coalition

Wulf Albers*, Helmut Crott, J. Keith Murnighan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Any group that includes three or more people provides the opportunity for its members to form coalitions. This study used two three‐person games to investigate the formation of blocs, the joint action of two people against a third. The process as well as the outcomes of negotiations were observed: in addition to the two games, the secrecy of negotiations and the experience of the bargainers were studied. The results did not support either the applicable game theoretic predictions, or several hypotheses concerning the independent variables. Equal splits of the potential payoffs and altruistic blocs, who offered relatively high payoffs to the excluded third players, predominated. The results are discussed with respect to the political process or organizational groups.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)33-48
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Organizational Behavior
Volume6
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1985

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Applied Psychology
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Psychology(all)
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

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