TY - JOUR
T1 - The illusion of transparency in performance appraisals
T2 - When and why accuracy motivation explains unintentional feedback inflation
AU - Schaerer, Michael
AU - Kern, Mary
AU - Berger, Gail
AU - Medvec, Victoria
AU - Swaab, Roderick I.
N1 - Funding Information:
We would like to thank the INSEAD R&D Fund for providing funding for our studies, the INSEAD Behavioral Lab for assisting in data collection, and Stefan Thau and Will Maddux for providing critical feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 The Authors
PY - 2018/1
Y1 - 2018/1
N2 - The present research shows that managers communicate negative feedback ineffectively because they suffer from transparency illusions that cause them to overestimate how accurately employees perceive their feedback. We propose that these illusions emerge because managers are insufficiently motivated to engage in effortful thinking, which reduces the accuracy with which they communicate negative feedback to employees. Six studies (N = 1883) using actual performance appraisals within an organization and role plays with MBA students, undergraduates, and online participants show that transparency illusions are stronger when feedback is negative (Studies 1–2), that they are not driven by employee bias (Study 3), and occur because managers are insufficiently motivated to be accurate (Studies 4a–c). In addition, these studies demonstrate that transparency illusions are driven by more indirect communication by the manager and how different interventions can be used to mitigate these effects (Studies 4a–c). An internal meta-analysis including 11 studies from the file drawer (N = 1887) revealed a moderate effect size (d = 0.43) free of publication bias.
AB - The present research shows that managers communicate negative feedback ineffectively because they suffer from transparency illusions that cause them to overestimate how accurately employees perceive their feedback. We propose that these illusions emerge because managers are insufficiently motivated to engage in effortful thinking, which reduces the accuracy with which they communicate negative feedback to employees. Six studies (N = 1883) using actual performance appraisals within an organization and role plays with MBA students, undergraduates, and online participants show that transparency illusions are stronger when feedback is negative (Studies 1–2), that they are not driven by employee bias (Study 3), and occur because managers are insufficiently motivated to be accurate (Studies 4a–c). In addition, these studies demonstrate that transparency illusions are driven by more indirect communication by the manager and how different interventions can be used to mitigate these effects (Studies 4a–c). An internal meta-analysis including 11 studies from the file drawer (N = 1887) revealed a moderate effect size (d = 0.43) free of publication bias.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.obhdp.2017.09.002
DO - 10.1016/j.obhdp.2017.09.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85031327124
SN - 0749-5978
VL - 144
SP - 171
EP - 186
JO - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
JF - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
ER -