The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence

David Besanko; Shabtai Donnenfeld

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(88)90202-9

The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence

David Besanko^*, Shabtai Donnenfeld

^*Corresponding author for this work

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Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A model of entry deterrence is presented in which consumers are perfectly informed about an incumbent monopolist's product quality but are imperfectly informed about the qualities of potential entrants. To deter entry, the monopolist chooses a higher price and quality than he would in the absence of an entry threat.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	375-380
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	26
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90202-9
State	Published - 1988

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-1765(88)90202-9

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title = "The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence",

abstract = "A model of entry deterrence is presented in which consumers are perfectly informed about an incumbent monopolist's product quality but are imperfectly informed about the qualities of potential entrants. To deter entry, the monopolist chooses a higher price and quality than he would in the absence of an entry threat.",

author = "David Besanko and Shabtai Donnenfeld",

note = "Funding Information: * The first author{\textquoteright}s work has been supported by National Science Foundation thank Joseph Greenberg and David Wildasin for their helpful comments. {\textquoteright} Buzzell and Farris (1977) found that pioneering brands enjoy promotional over later entrants.",

year = "1988",

doi = "10.1016/0165-1765(88)90202-9",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "26",

pages = "375--380",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

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AU - Besanko, David

AU - Donnenfeld, Shabtai

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PY - 1988

Y1 - 1988

N2 - A model of entry deterrence is presented in which consumers are perfectly informed about an incumbent monopolist's product quality but are imperfectly informed about the qualities of potential entrants. To deter entry, the monopolist chooses a higher price and quality than he would in the absence of an entry threat.

AB - A model of entry deterrence is presented in which consumers are perfectly informed about an incumbent monopolist's product quality but are imperfectly informed about the qualities of potential entrants. To deter entry, the monopolist chooses a higher price and quality than he would in the absence of an entry threat.

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DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(88)90202-9

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EP - 380

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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