The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence

David Besanko; Shabtai Donnenfeld

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(88)90202-9

The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence

David Besanko^*, Shabtai Donnenfeld

^*Corresponding author for this work

Strategy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A model of entry deterrence is presented in which consumers are perfectly informed about an incumbent monopolist's product quality but are imperfectly informed about the qualities of potential entrants. To deter entry, the monopolist chooses a higher price and quality than he would in the absence of an entry threat.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	375-380
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	26
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90202-9
State	Published - Jan 1 1988

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/0165-1765(88)90202-9

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this

@article{6825b6d0fb5a47388acf5da5f19bd5e8,

title = "The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence",

abstract = "A model of entry deterrence is presented in which consumers are perfectly informed about an incumbent monopolist's product quality but are imperfectly informed about the qualities of potential entrants. To deter entry, the monopolist chooses a higher price and quality than he would in the absence of an entry threat.",

author = "David Besanko and Shabtai Donnenfeld",

year = "1988",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/0165-1765(88)90202-9",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "26",

pages = "375--380",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence

AU - Besanko, David

AU - Donnenfeld, Shabtai

PY - 1988/1/1

Y1 - 1988/1/1

N2 - A model of entry deterrence is presented in which consumers are perfectly informed about an incumbent monopolist's product quality but are imperfectly informed about the qualities of potential entrants. To deter entry, the monopolist chooses a higher price and quality than he would in the absence of an entry threat.

AB - A model of entry deterrence is presented in which consumers are perfectly informed about an incumbent monopolist's product quality but are imperfectly informed about the qualities of potential entrants. To deter entry, the monopolist chooses a higher price and quality than he would in the absence of an entry threat.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=45549118371&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=45549118371&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(88)90202-9

DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(88)90202-9

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:45549118371

VL - 26

SP - 375

EP - 380

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 4

ER -