The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence

David Besanko*, Shabtai Donnenfeld

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


A model of entry deterrence is presented in which consumers are perfectly informed about an incumbent monopolist's product quality but are imperfectly informed about the qualities of potential entrants. To deter entry, the monopolist chooses a higher price and quality than he would in the absence of an entry threat.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)375-380
Number of pages6
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1988

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'The impact of buyers' expectations on entry deterrence'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this