The impact of observation and action errors on informational cascades

Tho Ngoc Le, Vijay G. Subramanian, Randall A Berry

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In models of observational learning among Bayesian agents, informational cascades can result, in which agents ignore their private information and blindly follow the actions of other agents. This paper considers the impacts of two types of errors in such models: action errors, where agents occasionally choose sub-optimal actions and observation errors, where agents observe the action of another agent incorrectly. We investigate and compare the impact of these two types of errors on the agents' welfare and the probability of incorrect cascade. Using a Markov chain model, we derive the net payoff of each agent as a function of his private signal quality and the error rates. A main result of this analysis is that in certain cases, increasing the observation error rate can lead to higher welfare for all but a finite number of agents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number7039678
Pages (from-to)1917-1922
Number of pages6
JournalProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume2015-February
Issue numberFebruary
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014
Event2014 53rd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2014 - Los Angeles, United States
Duration: Dec 15 2014Dec 17 2014

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Cascade
Welfare
Error Rate
Bayesian Learning
Observation
Private Information
Markov Chain Model
Markov processes
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Model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Le, Tho Ngoc ; Subramanian, Vijay G. ; Berry, Randall A. / The impact of observation and action errors on informational cascades. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. 2014 ; Vol. 2015-February, No. February. pp. 1917-1922.
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The impact of observation and action errors on informational cascades. / Le, Tho Ngoc; Subramanian, Vijay G.; Berry, Randall A.

In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Vol. 2015-February, No. February, 7039678, 01.01.2014, p. 1917-1922.

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

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