The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects

Sanford Goldberg*, Jonathan Matheson

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)829-840
Number of pages12
JournalErkenntnis
Volume85
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic

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