The local response to tax limitation measures: Do local governments manipulate voters to increase revenues?

David N. Figlio, Arthur O'Sullivan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

35 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper provides evidence that some cities subject to a statewide tax limit manipulate their mix of productive and administrative services in an attempt to get voters to override the statewide limit. When a statewide limit reduces a city's budget, one manipulative response is to cut "service" inputs (for example, teachers or uniformed police officers) by a relatively large amount, while cutting administrative inputs by a relatively small amount. This approach reveals a relatively large trade-off between public and private goods, and the severe consequences from a tax limit may encourage local voters to override the statewide limit. We provide evidence that cities with local-override options tend to adopt this approach. Manipulation is most prevalent among cities run by city managers (as opposed to strong mayors).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)233-257
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Law and Economics
Volume44
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Law

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The local response to tax limitation measures: Do local governments manipulate voters to increase revenues?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this