Abstract
The paper analyzes the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides theoretical foundations: (a) to understand how the allocation of property rights on innovations may affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations; (b) to rationalize commonly observed features in research employment contracts, such as shop rights, trailer clauses, and the hired for doctrine; (c) to discuss the robustness of the so-called Schumpeterian hypotheses to endogenizing the organization of R&D; and (d) to provide a rationale for.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1185-1209 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Quarterly Journal of Economics |
| Volume | 109 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Nov 1994 |
Funding
Rebecca Henderson, Gary Pisano, Diego Rodriguez, and Andrei Shleifer for their help. This paper served as the basis for the 1993 Elisha Pazner lecture at the University of Tel Aviv, which the second author had the honor to give. The second author is also grateful to France Telecom (Centre National d'Etudes des Telecommunications) and the Commissariat General du Plan for financial support.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics