Abstract
The paper analyzes the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides theoretical foundations: (a) to understand how the allocation of property rights on innovations may affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations; (b) to rationalize commonly observed features in research employment contracts, such as shop rights, trailer clauses, and the hired for doctrine; (c) to discuss the robustness of the so-called Schumpeterian hypotheses to endogenizing the organization of R&D; and (d) to provide a rationale for.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1185-1209 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Quarterly Journal of Economics |
Volume | 109 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Nov 1994 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics