The management of innovation

Philippe Aghion; Jean Tirole

doi:10.2307/2118360

The management of innovation

Philippe Aghion, Jean Tirole

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

539 Scopus citations

Abstract

The paper analyzes the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides theoretical foundations: (a) to understand how the allocation of property rights on innovations may affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations; (b) to rationalize commonly observed features in research employment contracts, such as shop rights, trailer clauses, and the hired for doctrine; (c) to discuss the robustness of the so-called Schumpeterian hypotheses to endogenizing the organization of R&D; and (d) to provide a rationale for.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1185-1209
Number of pages	25
Journal	Quarterly Journal of Economics
Volume	109
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2307/2118360
State	Published - Nov 1994

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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abstract = "The paper analyzes the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides theoretical foundations: (a) to understand how the allocation of property rights on innovations may affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations; (b) to rationalize commonly observed features in research employment contracts, such as shop rights, trailer clauses, and the hired for doctrine; (c) to discuss the robustness of the so-called Schumpeterian hypotheses to endogenizing the organization of R&D; and (d) to provide a rationale for.",

author = "Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole",

note = "Funding Information: Rebecca Henderson, Gary Pisano, Diego Rodriguez, and Andrei Shleifer for their help. This paper served as the basis for the 1993 Elisha Pazner lecture at the University of Tel Aviv, which the second author had the honor to give. The second author is also grateful to France Telecom (Centre National d'Etudes des Telecommunications) and the Commissariat General du Plan for financial support.",

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AB - The paper analyzes the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides theoretical foundations: (a) to understand how the allocation of property rights on innovations may affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations; (b) to rationalize commonly observed features in research employment contracts, such as shop rights, trailer clauses, and the hired for doctrine; (c) to discuss the robustness of the so-called Schumpeterian hypotheses to endogenizing the organization of R&D; and (d) to provide a rationale for.

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The management of innovation

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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