The Nuisance Principle in Infinite Settings

Sean Christopher Ebels Duggan*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Neo-Fregeans have been troubled by the Nuisance Principle (NP), an abstraction principle that is consistent but not jointly (second-order) satisfiable with the favored abstraction principle HP. We show that logically this situation persists if one looks at joint (second-order) consistency rather than satisfiability: under a modest assumption about infinite concepts, NP is also inconsistent with HP.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)263-268
Number of pages6
JournalThought
Volume4
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015

Keywords

  • Abstraction principles
  • Neo-Fregean
  • Neo-logicism
  • Philosophy of mathematics
  • Second-order logic

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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