Abstract
Neo-Fregeans have been troubled by the Nuisance Principle (NP), an abstraction principle that is consistent but not jointly (second-order) satisfiable with the favored abstraction principle HP. We show that logically this situation persists if one looks at joint (second-order) consistency rather than satisfiability: under a modest assumption about infinite concepts, NP is also inconsistent with HP.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 263-268 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Thought |
Volume | 4 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 1 2015 |
Keywords
- Abstraction principles
- Neo-Fregean
- Neo-logicism
- Philosophy of mathematics
- Second-order logic
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy