The optimal amount of discretion to allow in disclosure

Michael J. Fishman*, Kathleen M. Hagerty

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

62 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper a party with private information can verifiably disclose some, but not all, of his information. The optimal amount of discretion to allow the informed party is studied. That is, should the informed party be allowed unlimited discretion in choosing which elements of his information set to disclose, or should restrictions be imposed that limit this discretion? The model is formulated in the spirit of a “persuasion game.” It is demonstrated that under certain circumstances, rules that limit discretion increase the informativeness of disclosures and thus improve economic decisions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)427-444
Number of pages18
JournalQuarterly Journal of Economics
Volume105
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1990

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The optimal amount of discretion to allow in disclosure'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this