The Political Economy of Occupational Licensing Associations

Nicola Persico*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article studies the internal politics of a licensing association with regard to expansion of the licensure and self-regulation. A theoretical model is presented of a professional association that has the power to restrict entry, and yet a majority of its members may prefer to allow entry, even when doing so reduces the total revenue of its members. This may happen due to a conflict of interest among professional sub-specialties. On the other hand, the model predicts no heterogeneity of interests within the association regarding self-regulation. (JEL J44)

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)213-241
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Volume31
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Law

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