TY - JOUR
T1 - The populist challenge to European defense
AU - Henke, Marina
AU - Maher, Richard
N1 - Funding Information:
A previous version of this paper was presented at the ?Bordering Europe? conference at the European University Institute, 30?31 May 2019. For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, we thank Markus Jachtenfuchs, Frank Schimmelfennig, and the anonymous reviewers.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - This article assesses the consequences and implications of the rise of European populist parties for European defense cooperation. Focusing on six of the most prominent populist parties in Europe today, we examine their positions along three important defense-related issues: recommended national force posture; integrated military forces; and main national security threats. To determine their position on these three issues, we examine every party manifesto and, if available, official party document on security and defense policy since 2010. We argue that the rise of populism in Europe does not represent an inflection point for the future of European defense cooperation. Instead, our analysis reveals the following three findings: European defense cooperation will continue to be essentially ad hoc, functionally driven, and issue specific; populist parties’ attitudes and preferences regarding European defense cooperation both overlap with and diverge from those of other populists and non-populists in the EU; and populism over time may contribute to a shift in domestic preferences toward a Europe that more readily embraces military power.
AB - This article assesses the consequences and implications of the rise of European populist parties for European defense cooperation. Focusing on six of the most prominent populist parties in Europe today, we examine their positions along three important defense-related issues: recommended national force posture; integrated military forces; and main national security threats. To determine their position on these three issues, we examine every party manifesto and, if available, official party document on security and defense policy since 2010. We argue that the rise of populism in Europe does not represent an inflection point for the future of European defense cooperation. Instead, our analysis reveals the following three findings: European defense cooperation will continue to be essentially ad hoc, functionally driven, and issue specific; populist parties’ attitudes and preferences regarding European defense cooperation both overlap with and diverge from those of other populists and non-populists in the EU; and populism over time may contribute to a shift in domestic preferences toward a Europe that more readily embraces military power.
KW - European Union
KW - European defense
KW - international relations
KW - populism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85100975168&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85100975168&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2021.1881587
DO - 10.1080/13501763.2021.1881587
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85100975168
SN - 1350-1763
VL - 28
SP - 389
EP - 406
JO - Journal of European Public Policy
JF - Journal of European Public Policy
IS - 3
ER -