The private returns to public office

Raymond Fisman; Florian Schulz; Vikrant Vig

doi:10.1086/676334

The private returns to public office

Raymond Fisman, Florian Schulz, Vikrant Vig

Finance

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

56 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the wealth accumulation of Indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates. The annual asset growth of winners is 3-5 percent higher than that of runners-up, a difference that holds also in a set of close elections. The relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions. These results are consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for the relatively high rate of growth in winners' assets.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	806-862
Number of pages	57
Journal	Journal of Political Economy
Volume	122
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1086/676334
State	Published - Aug 2014

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1086/676334

Cite this

@article{b7ce5b7727de4eee83b54de29ba7c4aa,

title = "The private returns to public office",

abstract = "We study the wealth accumulation of Indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates. The annual asset growth of winners is 3-5 percent higher than that of runners-up, a difference that holds also in a set of close elections. The relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions. These results are consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for the relatively high rate of growth in winners' assets.",

author = "Raymond Fisman and Florian Schulz and Vikrant Vig",

year = "2014",

month = aug,

doi = "10.1086/676334",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "122",

pages = "806--862",

journal = "Journal of Political Economy",

issn = "0022-3808",

publisher = "University of Chicago",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The private returns to public office

AU - Fisman, Raymond

AU - Schulz, Florian

AU - Vig, Vikrant

PY - 2014/8

Y1 - 2014/8

N2 - We study the wealth accumulation of Indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates. The annual asset growth of winners is 3-5 percent higher than that of runners-up, a difference that holds also in a set of close elections. The relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions. These results are consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for the relatively high rate of growth in winners' assets.

AB - We study the wealth accumulation of Indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates. The annual asset growth of winners is 3-5 percent higher than that of runners-up, a difference that holds also in a set of close elections. The relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions. These results are consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for the relatively high rate of growth in winners' assets.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84904438209&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84904438209&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1086/676334

DO - 10.1086/676334

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84904438209

SN - 0022-3808

VL - 122

SP - 806

EP - 862

JO - Journal of Political Economy

JF - Journal of Political Economy

IS - 4

ER -

The private returns to public office

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this