The regulation of multiproduct firms. Part II: Applications to competitive environments and policy analysis

Jean Jacques Laffont*, Jean Tirole

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    12 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    This paper extends our companion paper [Part I - Laffont and Tirole (1990)] on the regulation of the rate of return and prices of a multiproduct firm in two directions. First, it studies optimal pricing by a regulated firm competing with regulated or unregulated rivals, with or without market power or other distorted pricing. It then focuses on the access pricing problem and its potential foreclosure effects. Second, it shows how optimal pricing can be decentralized to the regulated firm in the absence of cost and demand information.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)37-66
    Number of pages30
    JournalJournal of Public Economics
    Volume43
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 1990

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

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