The regulation of multiproduct firms. Part II: Applications to competitive environments and policy analysis

Jean Jacques Laffont; Jean Tirole

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(90)90050-R

The regulation of multiproduct firms. Part II: Applications to competitive environments and policy analysis

Jean Jacques Laffont^*, Jean Tirole

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper extends our companion paper [Part I - Laffont and Tirole (1990)] on the regulation of the rate of return and prices of a multiproduct firm in two directions. First, it studies optimal pricing by a regulated firm competing with regulated or unregulated rivals, with or without market power or other distorted pricing. It then focuses on the access pricing problem and its potential foreclosure effects. Second, it shows how optimal pricing can be decentralized to the regulated firm in the absence of cost and demand information.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	37-66
Number of pages	30
Journal	Journal of Public Economics
Volume	43
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(90)90050-R
State	Published - Oct 1990
Externally published	Yes

Funding

*The authors are grateful to Frank Fisher, Paul Joskow, David Sappington, Dick Schmalensee and two anonymous referees for helpful comments, and to the Ford Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trust, the Guggenheim Foundation, the Center for Energy Policy Research at MIT, the National Science Foundation and the Ministire de I’Education Nationale for financial support.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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Cite this

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title = "The regulation of multiproduct firms. Part II: Applications to competitive environments and policy analysis",

abstract = "This paper extends our companion paper [Part I - Laffont and Tirole (1990)] on the regulation of the rate of return and prices of a multiproduct firm in two directions. First, it studies optimal pricing by a regulated firm competing with regulated or unregulated rivals, with or without market power or other distorted pricing. It then focuses on the access pricing problem and its potential foreclosure effects. Second, it shows how optimal pricing can be decentralized to the regulated firm in the absence of cost and demand information.",

author = "Laffont, {Jean Jacques} and Jean Tirole",

note = "Funding Information: *The authors are grateful to Frank Fisher, Paul Joskow, David Sappington, Dick Schmalensee and two anonymous referees for helpful comments, and to the Ford Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trust, the Guggenheim Foundation, the Center for Energy Policy Research at MIT, the National Science Foundation and the Ministire de I{\textquoteright}Education Nationale for financial support.",

year = "1990",

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doi = "10.1016/0047-2727(90)90050-R",

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PY - 1990/10

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N2 - This paper extends our companion paper [Part I - Laffont and Tirole (1990)] on the regulation of the rate of return and prices of a multiproduct firm in two directions. First, it studies optimal pricing by a regulated firm competing with regulated or unregulated rivals, with or without market power or other distorted pricing. It then focuses on the access pricing problem and its potential foreclosure effects. Second, it shows how optimal pricing can be decentralized to the regulated firm in the absence of cost and demand information.

AB - This paper extends our companion paper [Part I - Laffont and Tirole (1990)] on the regulation of the rate of return and prices of a multiproduct firm in two directions. First, it studies optimal pricing by a regulated firm competing with regulated or unregulated rivals, with or without market power or other distorted pricing. It then focuses on the access pricing problem and its potential foreclosure effects. Second, it shows how optimal pricing can be decentralized to the regulated firm in the absence of cost and demand information.

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The regulation of multiproduct firms. Part II: Applications to competitive environments and policy analysis

Abstract

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