The Role of Games in Security Design

M. Harris, A. Raviv

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We contend that security design should be approached as a problem of game design. That is, contracts should specify that procedures that govern the behavior of contract participants in determining outcomes as well as the allocations resulting from those outcomes. We characterize optimal contracts in two nested classes: all contracts (including those that depend on the state) and state-independent contracts. We demonstrate that, in situations in which the dependence of contracts on the state is limited, contracts designed as games can improve the allocation of resources relative to nonstrategic allocation rules.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)327-367
JournalRev. Financ. Stud.
StatePublished - 1995

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