TY - JOUR
T1 - The rotten carrot
T2 - US-Turkish bargaining failure over Iraq in 2003 and the pitfalls of social embeddedness
AU - Henke, Marina E.
N1 - Funding Information:
The author would like to thank the numerous individuals who made her extensive field research in Turkey possible. She is especially grateful to the people who agreed to be interviewed. Some of them are cited in this article. Others prefer to remain anonymous. To all she extents her profound and heartful thanks. For helpful comments and advice, the author thanks Ayc¸ a Alemdar-oglu, Andrew Roberts, and Bas¸ak Yavc¸an, as well as participants at the Keyman speaker series at Northwestern’s Buffett Institute for Global Studies, the 2016 BISA Conference, and the 2016 ISSS-ISAC conference, where earlier versions of this article were presented. The author is also grateful to the Keyman Modern Turkish Studies Program at Northwestern University for financial support. Joe Baka, Yalin C¸ etiner, Julian Gerez, Mert Nizamoglu, Hansen Ong, and Amelia Strauss provided excellent research assistance. The author also thanks the anonymous reviewers and editors at Security Studies for particularly valuable help and guidance.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
PY - 2018/1/2
Y1 - 2018/1/2
N2 - Side-payments are commonly used in international relations to alter the foreign policies of states. Despite their frequent usage, however, our understanding is very limited as to why certain sidepayment negotiations succeed, while others fail. This article tries to remedy this shortcoming. It argues that social embeddedness between actors involved in the negotiations has a major bearing on bargaining outcomes. Under ideal circumstances, social relationships can be used to reduce information asymmetries and increase trust. But in the presence of fractured social networks, social ties can foster information bias and distrust, ultimately increasing the likelihood of bargaining failure. The US-Turkish bargaining failure over the Iraq intervention in 2003 is used to illustrate and test this theory.
AB - Side-payments are commonly used in international relations to alter the foreign policies of states. Despite their frequent usage, however, our understanding is very limited as to why certain sidepayment negotiations succeed, while others fail. This article tries to remedy this shortcoming. It argues that social embeddedness between actors involved in the negotiations has a major bearing on bargaining outcomes. Under ideal circumstances, social relationships can be used to reduce information asymmetries and increase trust. But in the presence of fractured social networks, social ties can foster information bias and distrust, ultimately increasing the likelihood of bargaining failure. The US-Turkish bargaining failure over the Iraq intervention in 2003 is used to illustrate and test this theory.
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U2 - 10.1080/09636412.2017.1360077
DO - 10.1080/09636412.2017.1360077
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85028536090
SN - 0963-6412
VL - 27
SP - 120
EP - 147
JO - Security Studies
JF - Security Studies
IS - 1
ER -