The rules of standard-setting organizations: An empirical analysis

Benjamin Chiao*, Josh Lerner, Jean Tirole

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    86 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    This article empirically explores standard-setting organizations 'policy choices. Consistent with our earlier theoretical work, we find (i) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (ii) a positive correlation between the sponsor friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker when there is only a limited number of SSOs.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)905-930
    Number of pages26
    JournalRAND Journal of Economics
    Volume38
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2007

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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