The simple geometry of perfect information games

Stefano Demichelis*, Klaus Ritzberger, Jeroen M. Swinkels

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence, after a very mild deformation, looks like the space of perfect information extensive form games.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)315-338
Number of pages24
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume32
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2004

Keywords

  • Extensive form games
  • Perfect information
  • Subgame perfection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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