The spatial theory of electoral competition: instability, institutions and information.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

Reviews the literature on the spatial theory of electoral competition, initiated by Downs. Two main lines of inquiry are distinguished. The first is concerned with the purely analytical properties of majority preference as an aggregation rule for mapping individual preferences into social preferences. The second is devoted to providing explanations of the choices of political decision-makers, and the consequences of these choices, within a simple plurality electoral system. These two lines are intimately related. -Author

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)439-460
Number of pages22
JournalEnvironment & Planning C: Government & Policy
Volume1
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jan 1 1983

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Environmental Science (miscellaneous)
  • Public Administration
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

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