TY - JOUR
T1 - The strategy of manipulating conflict
AU - Baliga, Sandeep
AU - Sjöström, Tomas
PY - 2012/10
Y1 - 2012/10
N2 - Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An "extremist," who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements).
AB - Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An "extremist," who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements).
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U2 - 10.1257/aer.102.6.2897
DO - 10.1257/aer.102.6.2897
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:84867733117
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 102
SP - 2897
EP - 2922
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 6
ER -