The strategy of manipulating conflict

Sandeep Baliga*, Tomas Sjöström

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

24 Scopus citations

Abstract

Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An "extremist," who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2897-2922
Number of pages26
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume102
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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