The theory of implementation when the planner is a player

Sandeep Baliga*, Luis C. Corchon, Tomas Sjöström

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

32 Scopus citations


In this paper we study a situation where the planner cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome function is substituted by the planner herself. We assume (i) agents have complete information and play simultaneously and (ii) given the messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation problem into a signaling game. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different restrictions on the planner's out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We compare our results to standard results on Nash implementation.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)15-33
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Nov 1997

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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