TY - JOUR
T1 - The underused and overused privileges and immunities clause
AU - Redish, Martin H.
AU - Johnson, Brandon
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors wish to thank the National Submicron Research and Resource Facility for the fabrication of the mask pattern. This research is supported in part by AFOSR. Shu-tong Zhou and Zong-Qi Lin are Visiting Scholars from the People's Republic of China.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Boston University Law Review. All rights reserved.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - In this Article, the authors argue that Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause has been seriously underused due to a series of puzzling and highly dubious Supreme Court decisions imposing artificial and counterproductive limitations on the Clause's reach. They urge that with the removal of these harmful and misguided doctrinal restrictions, the Clause would serve the important function it was intended to serve: the avoidance of interstate friction and the prevention of the degeneration of the nation's federal system. At the same time, the authors warn against the dangerous and unsupportable efforts by libertarian scholars to misuse the doctrine growing out of this Clause's interpretation to create a constitutional portal by which the Clause can be manipulated into a textual source of unenumerated individual rights that would seriously threaten core notions of American democracy. Careful examination of both the Clause's constitutional text and doctrine, as well as the relevant historical context, demonstrates that the libertarian approach unjustifiably transforms a structural provision designed to deal exclusively with issues of constitutional federalism into a sweeping judicial power to create individual rights found nowhere in the Constitution's text. It is, then, only by avoiding the doctrinal underuse and the scholarly overuse that the Privileges and Immunities Clause can serve the valuable structural role it was clearly intended to serve.
AB - In this Article, the authors argue that Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause has been seriously underused due to a series of puzzling and highly dubious Supreme Court decisions imposing artificial and counterproductive limitations on the Clause's reach. They urge that with the removal of these harmful and misguided doctrinal restrictions, the Clause would serve the important function it was intended to serve: the avoidance of interstate friction and the prevention of the degeneration of the nation's federal system. At the same time, the authors warn against the dangerous and unsupportable efforts by libertarian scholars to misuse the doctrine growing out of this Clause's interpretation to create a constitutional portal by which the Clause can be manipulated into a textual source of unenumerated individual rights that would seriously threaten core notions of American democracy. Careful examination of both the Clause's constitutional text and doctrine, as well as the relevant historical context, demonstrates that the libertarian approach unjustifiably transforms a structural provision designed to deal exclusively with issues of constitutional federalism into a sweeping judicial power to create individual rights found nowhere in the Constitution's text. It is, then, only by avoiding the doctrinal underuse and the scholarly overuse that the Privileges and Immunities Clause can serve the valuable structural role it was clearly intended to serve.
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M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:85075435838
SN - 0006-8047
VL - 99
SP - 1535
EP - 1576
JO - Boston University Law Review
JF - Boston University Law Review
IS - 4
ER -