The value of information structures in zero-sum games with lack of information on one side

Eran Shmaya

doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0018-5

The value of information structures in zero-sum games with lack of information on one side

Eran Shmaya^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Two players are engaged in a zero-sum game with lack of information on one side, in which player 1 (the informed player) receives some stochastic signal about the state of nature. I consider the value of the game as a function of player 1's information structure, and study the properties of this function. It turns out that these properties reflect the fact that in zero sum situation the value of information for each player is positive.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	155-165
Number of pages	11
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	34
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0018-5
State	Published - Jul 1 2006

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1007/s00182-006-0018-5

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The value of information structures in zero-sum games with lack of information on one side

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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