The value of information structures in zero-sum games with lack of information on one side

Eran Shmaya*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Two players are engaged in a zero-sum game with lack of information on one side, in which player 1 (the informed player) receives some stochastic signal about the state of nature. I consider the value of the game as a function of player 1's information structure, and study the properties of this function. It turns out that these properties reflect the fact that in zero sum situation the value of information for each player is positive.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)155-165
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume34
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2006

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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