Tiered Spectrum Measurement Markets for Licensed Secondary Spectrum

Arnob Ghosh*, Randall A Berry, Vaneet Aggarwal

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

The recent framework for tiered spectrum sharing in the 3.5 GHz band allows for environmental sensing capability (ESC) operators to measure spectrum occupancy so as to enable commercial use of this spectrum when incumbent users are not present. Motivated by this, we consider a scenario in which two spectrum access (SA) firms seek to access a spectrum band for secondary access and must in turn purchase spectrum measurements from one of the two ESCs. Each SA has an exclusive licensed access to a spectrum band. Given the purchased measurements, the SAs compete on price to serve customers. We study how the ESCs’ cost of obtaining the spectrum measurement, the ESC’s prices, and the quality of the spectrum measurements impact the resulting market equilibrium between the SAs. In particular, we show that when the ESCs offer different qualities, the only equilibria that can exist are when both SAs purchase measurements from the same ESC.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationStatic and Dynamic Game Theory
Subtitle of host publicationFoundations and Applications
PublisherBirkhauser
Pages165-182
Number of pages18
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

Publication series

NameStatic and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
ISSN (Print)2363-8516
ISSN (Electronic)2363-8524

Fingerprint

Sensing
Market Equilibrium
Market
Spectrum Sharing
Costs
Customers
Scenarios
Operator
Purchase
Business
Framework
Incumbents
Market equilibrium

Keywords

  • CBRS
  • Game theory
  • Spectrum sharing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Ghosh, A., Berry, R. A., & Aggarwal, V. (2019). Tiered Spectrum Measurement Markets for Licensed Secondary Spectrum. In Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications (pp. 165-182). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). Birkhauser. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10880-9_10
Ghosh, Arnob ; Berry, Randall A ; Aggarwal, Vaneet. / Tiered Spectrum Measurement Markets for Licensed Secondary Spectrum. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhauser, 2019. pp. 165-182 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).
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Ghosh, A, Berry, RA & Aggarwal, V 2019, Tiered Spectrum Measurement Markets for Licensed Secondary Spectrum. in Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, Birkhauser, pp. 165-182. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10880-9_10

Tiered Spectrum Measurement Markets for Licensed Secondary Spectrum. / Ghosh, Arnob; Berry, Randall A; Aggarwal, Vaneet.

Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhauser, 2019. p. 165-182 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Ghosh A, Berry RA, Aggarwal V. Tiered Spectrum Measurement Markets for Licensed Secondary Spectrum. In Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhauser. 2019. p. 165-182. (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10880-9_10