TY - JOUR
T1 - Time allocation and task juggling
AU - Coviello, Decio
AU - Ichino, Andrea
AU - Persico, Nicola
PY - 2014/2
Y1 - 2014/2
N2 - A single worker allocates her time among different projects which are progressively assigned. When the worker works on too many projects at the same time, the output rate decreases and completion time increases according to a law which we derive. We call this phenomenon "task juggling" and argue that it is pervasive in the workplace. We show that task juggling is a strategic substitute of worker effort. We then present a model where task juggling is the result of lobbying by clients, or coworkers, each seeking to get the worker to apply effort to his project ahead of the others'.
AB - A single worker allocates her time among different projects which are progressively assigned. When the worker works on too many projects at the same time, the output rate decreases and completion time increases according to a law which we derive. We call this phenomenon "task juggling" and argue that it is pervasive in the workplace. We show that task juggling is a strategic substitute of worker effort. We then present a model where task juggling is the result of lobbying by clients, or coworkers, each seeking to get the worker to apply effort to his project ahead of the others'.
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U2 - 10.1257/aer.104.2.609
DO - 10.1257/aer.104.2.609
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84894117311
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 104
SP - 609
EP - 623
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 2
ER -