Abstract
Tony Blair tried throughout the preparatory phase of the US-led Iraq intervention in 2003 to influence US policy on the Middle East Peace Process. This article tries to understand how Blair fared in this endeavour. Using newly declassified documents, it examines the circumstances under which the US administration listened and engaged with British ideas and when and why it ignored British requests. The study shows that Blair was able to extract the greatest US concessions on the Middle East Peace Process in moments when Great Britain’s participation in the Iraq campaign was the most uncertain. The findings promote fresh thinking on how, when and why the United Kingdom can influence US decision-making.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 773-789 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | British Journal of Politics and International Relations |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Nov 1 2018 |
Funding
The author thanks Simone Cruikshank Rivera for terrific research assistance and the European University Institute (EUI) for hosting her while much of this article was written. The author also thanks Robert Keohane, Karen Alter, Hendrik Spruyt, Ian Hurd, Steve Nelson, Alex Thompson, Ulrich Krotz, Stefanie von Hlatky, Stefano Recchia and the anonymous reviewers and editors at BJPIR for valuable help and guidance. This research benefitted from the generous support of the Farrell Fund at Northwestern University. This research benefitted from the generous support of the Farrell Fund at Northwestern University.
Keywords
- British foreign policy
- Iraq intervention
- US–UK relations
- diplomacy
- international negotiations
- special relationship
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Political Science and International Relations
- Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law