Truthful revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency games

Alessandro Pavan, Giacomo Calzolari

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

We introduce new revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency games which, although they do not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, do facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes that are typically of interest in applications. We then show how these mechanisms can be used in applications such as menu auctions, competition in nonlinear tariffs, and moral hazard settings. Lastly, we show how one can enrich the revelation mechanisms, albeit at a cost of an increase in complexity, to characterize all possible equilibrium outcomes, including those sustained by non-Markov strategies and/or mixed-strategy profiles.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)132-190
Number of pages59
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume2
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2009

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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