TY - GEN
T1 - Two-player D2D interference canceling games
AU - Zhou, Liang
AU - Tirkkonen, Olav
AU - Berry, Randall
N1 - Funding Information:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT The work of LZ has been supported in part by EIT-DIGITAL (HII-ACTIVE) and TEKES (Take5), the work of OT in part by Kaute Foundation and the Academy of Finland (grant 299916), and the work of RB in part by US National Science Foundation (grant CNS-1701921).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2018/2/14
Y1 - 2018/2/14
N2 - We investigate a set of non-cooperative radio resource management games in a Gaussian interference channel, where the receivers are equipped with two stage Successive Interference Cancellers (SIC). In these games users decide on their transmission power, rate and Interference Canceling (IC) strategy. A one-shot game, as well as two-stage variants, where either rate, or IC and rate, are decided in the second stage, are considered. We characterize the equilibria of the games and establish a relationship between the equilibria of the one shot and two-stage games. Postponing the rate decision to a second stage stabilizes the game in a region where no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists for the one-shot game. Further postponing the IC decision to a second stage stabilizes the game completely, an equilibrium exists in all network configurations. We simulate a 2-pair device-to-device network where these games are used for radio resource management. The regions where the one-shot game is unstable have a considerable probability, leading to a considerable outage probability. By staging the game, such outage can be mitigated, or removed altogether.
AB - We investigate a set of non-cooperative radio resource management games in a Gaussian interference channel, where the receivers are equipped with two stage Successive Interference Cancellers (SIC). In these games users decide on their transmission power, rate and Interference Canceling (IC) strategy. A one-shot game, as well as two-stage variants, where either rate, or IC and rate, are decided in the second stage, are considered. We characterize the equilibria of the games and establish a relationship between the equilibria of the one shot and two-stage games. Postponing the rate decision to a second stage stabilizes the game in a region where no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists for the one-shot game. Further postponing the IC decision to a second stage stabilizes the game completely, an equilibrium exists in all network configurations. We simulate a 2-pair device-to-device network where these games are used for radio resource management. The regions where the one-shot game is unstable have a considerable probability, leading to a considerable outage probability. By staging the game, such outage can be mitigated, or removed altogether.
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U2 - 10.1109/PIMRC.2017.8292615
DO - 10.1109/PIMRC.2017.8292615
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85045258647
T3 - IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC
SP - 1
EP - 7
BT - 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 28th Annual IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC 2017
Y2 - 8 October 2017 through 13 October 2017
ER -