Two-player nonzero-sum stopping games in discrete time

Eran Shmaya*, Eilon Solan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an ε-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every ε > 0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which enables us to reduce the problem to that of studying properties of ε-equilibria in a simple class of stochastic games with finite state space.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2733-2764
Number of pages32
JournalAnnals of Probability
Volume32
Issue number3 B
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2004

Keywords

  • Dynkin games
  • Randomized stopping times
  • Stochastic games
  • Stopping games
  • ε-equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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