TY - JOUR
T1 - Ultimatum bargaining by children and adults
AU - Murnighan, J. Keith
AU - Saxon, Michael Scott
N1 - Funding Information:
We would like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Susan Bruce, Robert Handlin, Lynn and Howard Thomas, Susan Zola, and the school systems of Urbana, Champaign, and Mahomet, Illinois, for providing us with the opportunity to conduct this study. We also thank Maria Crisafi, Chuck McClintock, Greg Oldham, Madan Pillutla, Paul Straub, and two anonymous reviewers, for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper, and Leann Mischel for her assistance in collecting the data. Portions of this paper were completed while the first author was a faculty member at the University of Illinois and while he was a director of the Summer Institute on Conflict and Negotiation Research, 1992, at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. The support of the Andrew Mellon Foundation and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is sincerely appreciated.
Copyright:
Copyright 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 1998/8
Y1 - 1998/8
N2 - Recent research on ultimatum bargaining, the fact that children often confront and use ultimatums, and theories of developmental psychology all combine to suggest that studying children's ultimatum behavior will be particularly enlightening, both theoretically and with respect to the development of bargaining behavior. The results from two experiments indicate that younger children made larger offers and accepted smaller offers than older participants. Boys took greater strategic advantage of asymmetric information than girls; this dichotomy began with nine-year-olds (third graders) and continued for twelve- and fifteen-year-olds (sixth and ninth graders) as well as for college students. Like adults, children accepted smaller offers when they did not know how much was being divided. Older children required increasingly higher offers, except for college students who were willing to accept considerably less than others. Also, some of the nine-year-olds displayed an extremely strong sense of fairness. The discussion focuses on the development of bargaining strategies and concerns for fairness.
AB - Recent research on ultimatum bargaining, the fact that children often confront and use ultimatums, and theories of developmental psychology all combine to suggest that studying children's ultimatum behavior will be particularly enlightening, both theoretically and with respect to the development of bargaining behavior. The results from two experiments indicate that younger children made larger offers and accepted smaller offers than older participants. Boys took greater strategic advantage of asymmetric information than girls; this dichotomy began with nine-year-olds (third graders) and continued for twelve- and fifteen-year-olds (sixth and ninth graders) as well as for college students. Like adults, children accepted smaller offers when they did not know how much was being divided. Older children required increasingly higher offers, except for college students who were willing to accept considerably less than others. Also, some of the nine-year-olds displayed an extremely strong sense of fairness. The discussion focuses on the development of bargaining strategies and concerns for fairness.
KW - Adults
KW - Children
KW - Fairness
KW - Ultimatum bargaining
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U2 - 10.1016/S0167-4870(98)00017-8
DO - 10.1016/S0167-4870(98)00017-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0039986520
SN - 0167-4870
VL - 19
SP - 415
EP - 445
JO - Journal of Economic Psychology
JF - Journal of Economic Psychology
IS - 4
ER -