Abstract
A central question in group decision theory is the existence of a simple mechanism that necessarily leads to Pareto optimal outcomes despite noncooperative behavior of the participants. It is shown that the multistage unanimity game is such a mechanism if we assume that the non-cooperative players end at an equilibria which is symmetric and persistent.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 41-50 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 1985 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty