Unanimity games and Pareto optimality

E. Kalai*, D. Samet

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

A central question in group decision theory is the existence of a simple mechanism that necessarily leads to Pareto optimal outcomes despite noncooperative behavior of the participants. It is shown that the multistage unanimity game is such a mechanism if we assume that the non-cooperative players end at an equilibria which is symmetric and persistent.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)41-50
Number of pages10
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume14
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1985

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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