Unionization, product market competition, and strategic disclosure

Daniel Aobdia*, Lin Cheng

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

30 Scopus citations


We examine the disclosure policies of non-unionized firms operating in unionized industries. We test the hypothesis that non-unionized firms have an incentive to disclose more information when their unionized rivals are engaged in labor renegotiations; that is, to weaken them. We find that non-unionized firms disclose more information and more good news when renegotiations are ongoing. This behavior is stronger for larger firms, firms with fewer peers in the industry, and firms more similar to their renegotiating rivals. We also find some evidence that unionized firms are harmed by this behavior and that non-unionized firms benefit from their increased disclosures.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)331-357
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Accounting and Economics
Issue number2-3
StatePublished - Apr 1 2018


  • Disclosure
  • Information transfer
  • Labor unions
  • Product market competition
  • Proprietary costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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