Unobserved delegation

Chaim Fershtman, Ehud Kalai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

63 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper describes situations where commitment via delegation is beneficial, even when the delegation is unobservable and the players have the option to play the game themselves. The potential for such benefits depends on the type of delegation, incentive versus instructive, the possibility of repetition, and the probability of observability.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)763-774
Number of pages12
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume38
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1997

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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