Updating preferences with multiple priors

Eran Hanany*, Peter Klibanoff

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

73 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose and axiomatically characterize dynamically consistent update rules for decision making under ambiguity. These rules apply to the preferences with multiple priors of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and are the first, for any model of preferences over acts, to be able to reconcile typical behavior in the face of ambiguity (as exemplified by Ellsberg's paradox) with dynamic consistency for all nonnull events. Updating takes the form of applying Bayes' rule to subsets of the set of priors, where the specific subset depends on the preferences, the conditioning event, and the choice problem (i.e., a feasible set of acts together with an act chosen from that set).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)261-298
Number of pages38
JournalTheoretical Economics
Volume2
Issue number3
StatePublished - Sep 1 2007

Keywords

  • Ambiguity
  • Bayesian
  • Consequentialism
  • Dynamic consistency
  • Ellsberg
  • Updating

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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