Abstract
Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies. &
| Language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages | 415-432 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | American Journal of Political Science |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2014 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations
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Varieties of Clientelism : Machine Politics during Elections. / Gans-Morse, Jordan; Mazzuca, Sebastián; Nichter, Simeon.
In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, No. 2, 01.01.2014, p. 415-432.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Varieties of Clientelism
T2 - American Journal of Political Science
AU - Gans-Morse,Jordan
AU - Mazzuca,Sebastián
AU - Nichter,Simeon
PY - 2014/1/1
Y1 - 2014/1/1
N2 - Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies. &
AB - Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies. &
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84886513260&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84886513260&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/ajps.12058
DO - 10.1111/ajps.12058
M3 - Article
VL - 58
SP - 415
EP - 432
JO - American Journal of Political Science
JF - American Journal of Political Science
SN - 0092-5853
IS - 2
ER -