Voting

Alvaro Sandroni; Jonathan Pogach; Michela Tincani; Antonio Penta; Deniz Selman

doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_203

Voting

Alvaro Sandroni^*, Jonathan Pogach, Michela Tincani, Antonio Penta, Deniz Selman

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

Article Outline: Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction The Collective Choice Problem Voting Rules Welfare Economics Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Political Ignorance and the Condorcet Jury Theorem Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Political Competition and Strategic Voting The Common Value Setting with Strategic Agents Future Directions Bibliography

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Computational Complexity
Subtitle of host publication	Theory, Techniques, and Applications
Publisher	Springer New York
Pages	3280-3290
Number of pages	11
Volume	9781461418009
ISBN (Electronic)	9781461418009
ISBN (Print)	1461417996, 9781461417996
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_203
State	Published - Nov 1 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Science(all)

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10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_203

Cite this

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title = "Voting",

abstract = "Article Outline: Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction The Collective Choice Problem Voting Rules Welfare Economics Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Political Ignorance and the Condorcet Jury Theorem Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Political Competition and Strategic Voting The Common Value Setting with Strategic Agents Future Directions Bibliography",

author = "Alvaro Sandroni and Jonathan Pogach and Michela Tincani and Antonio Penta and Deniz Selman",

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AU - Sandroni, Alvaro

AU - Pogach, Jonathan

AU - Tincani, Michela

AU - Penta, Antonio

AU - Selman, Deniz

PY - 2012/11/1

Y1 - 2012/11/1

N2 - Article Outline: Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction The Collective Choice Problem Voting Rules Welfare Economics Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Political Ignorance and the Condorcet Jury Theorem Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Political Competition and Strategic Voting The Common Value Setting with Strategic Agents Future Directions Bibliography

AB - Article Outline: Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction The Collective Choice Problem Voting Rules Welfare Economics Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Political Ignorance and the Condorcet Jury Theorem Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Political Competition and Strategic Voting The Common Value Setting with Strategic Agents Future Directions Bibliography

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M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:84949180568

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PB - Springer New York

ER -

Voting

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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