Voting for Protection

Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior?

Bruce A. Blonigen, David N Figlio

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

The political economy of trade protection has long been of interest to economists and policy makers. The idea that levels of protection may be endogenous with trade flows has been a particularly important issue in the literature. In general, the endogenous protection literature postulates that import penetration will cause domestic interests to lobby more intensely for protection. Thus, higher levels of import penetration lead to increased protection. As a result, a number of papers (see, for example, Arye L. Hillman, 1982; Wolfgang Mayer, 1984; Robert E. Baldwin, 1985; Stephen P. Magee et al., 1989; Ronald D. Fischer, 1992) have established that foreign firms will import less under a regime of endogenous protection than one where the level of protection is exogenous to trade flows. On the empirical side, Daniel Trefler (1993) finds that ignoring the endogeneity of trade and protection understates the impact of U.S. protection on imports by a magnitude of ten..

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationWorld Scientific Studies in International Economics
PublisherWorld Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd
Pages447-471
Number of pages25
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameWorld Scientific Studies in International Economics
Volume72
ISSN (Print)1793-3641

Fingerprint

direct investment
foreign investment
import
voting
lobby
economist
political economy
regime
firm
cause
Voting
Direct foreign investment
literature

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Blonigen, B. A., & Figlio, D. N. (2019). Voting for Protection: Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior? In World Scientific Studies in International Economics (pp. 447-471). (World Scientific Studies in International Economics; Vol. 72). World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813277014_0013
Blonigen, Bruce A. ; Figlio, David N. / Voting for Protection : Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior?. World Scientific Studies in International Economics. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd, 2019. pp. 447-471 (World Scientific Studies in International Economics).
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Blonigen, BA & Figlio, DN 2019, Voting for Protection: Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior? in World Scientific Studies in International Economics. World Scientific Studies in International Economics, vol. 72, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd, pp. 447-471. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813277014_0013

Voting for Protection : Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior? / Blonigen, Bruce A.; Figlio, David N.

World Scientific Studies in International Economics. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd, 2019. p. 447-471 (World Scientific Studies in International Economics; Vol. 72).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Blonigen BA, Figlio DN. Voting for Protection: Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior? In World Scientific Studies in International Economics. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd. 2019. p. 447-471. (World Scientific Studies in International Economics). https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813277014_0013