Abstract
The political economy of trade protection has long been of interest to economists and policy makers. The idea that levels of protection may be endogenous with trade flows has been a particularly important issue in the literature. In general, the endogenous protection literature postulates that import penetration will cause domestic interests to lobby more intensely for protection. Thus, higher levels of import penetration lead to increased protection. As a result, a number of papers (see, for example, Arye L. Hillman, 1982; Wolfgang Mayer, 1984; Robert E. Baldwin, 1985; Stephen P. Magee et al., 1989; Ronald D. Fischer, 1992) have established that foreign firms will import less under a regime of endogenous protection than one where the level of protection is exogenous to trade flows. On the empirical side, Daniel Trefler (1993) finds that ignoring the endogeneity of trade and protection understates the impact of U.S. protection on imports by a magnitude of ten..
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | World Scientific Studies in International Economics |
| Publisher | World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd |
| Pages | 447-471 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Publication series
| Name | World Scientific Studies in International Economics |
|---|---|
| Volume | 72 |
| ISSN (Print) | 1793-3641 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Political Science and International Relations
Cite this
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Voting for Protection : Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior? / Blonigen, Bruce A.; Figlio, David N.
World Scientific Studies in International Economics. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd, 2019. p. 447-471 (World Scientific Studies in International Economics; Vol. 72).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter
TY - CHAP
T1 - Voting for Protection
T2 - Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior?
AU - Blonigen, Bruce A.
AU - Figlio, David N
PY - 2019/1/1
Y1 - 2019/1/1
N2 - The political economy of trade protection has long been of interest to economists and policy makers. The idea that levels of protection may be endogenous with trade flows has been a particularly important issue in the literature. In general, the endogenous protection literature postulates that import penetration will cause domestic interests to lobby more intensely for protection. Thus, higher levels of import penetration lead to increased protection. As a result, a number of papers (see, for example, Arye L. Hillman, 1982; Wolfgang Mayer, 1984; Robert E. Baldwin, 1985; Stephen P. Magee et al., 1989; Ronald D. Fischer, 1992) have established that foreign firms will import less under a regime of endogenous protection than one where the level of protection is exogenous to trade flows. On the empirical side, Daniel Trefler (1993) finds that ignoring the endogeneity of trade and protection understates the impact of U.S. protection on imports by a magnitude of ten..
AB - The political economy of trade protection has long been of interest to economists and policy makers. The idea that levels of protection may be endogenous with trade flows has been a particularly important issue in the literature. In general, the endogenous protection literature postulates that import penetration will cause domestic interests to lobby more intensely for protection. Thus, higher levels of import penetration lead to increased protection. As a result, a number of papers (see, for example, Arye L. Hillman, 1982; Wolfgang Mayer, 1984; Robert E. Baldwin, 1985; Stephen P. Magee et al., 1989; Ronald D. Fischer, 1992) have established that foreign firms will import less under a regime of endogenous protection than one where the level of protection is exogenous to trade flows. On the empirical side, Daniel Trefler (1993) finds that ignoring the endogeneity of trade and protection understates the impact of U.S. protection on imports by a magnitude of ten..
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85063391074&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85063391074&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1142/9789813277014_0013
DO - 10.1142/9789813277014_0013
M3 - Chapter
T3 - World Scientific Studies in International Economics
SP - 447
EP - 471
BT - World Scientific Studies in International Economics
PB - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd
ER -