Voting in the limelight

Ronen Gradwohl*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations


When committees make decisions, voting rules are coupled with one of three disclosure rules: open voting, in which each committee member’s individual vote is revealed; anonymous voting, in which only an anonymized tally is publicized; and secret voting, in which only the outcome is disclosed. I focus on strategic voters who have a preference for strategic ambiguity, and show that the amount of disclosure may have a non-monotonic effect on both the accuracy of the decision and the welfare of the voters. In particular, anonymous voting can yield both lower accuracy and higher welfare than both open and secret voting.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)65-103
Number of pages39
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jul 1 2018


  • Committees
  • Privacy
  • Transparency
  • Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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