What epistemologists of testimony should learn from philosophers of science

Sanford C. Goldberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that, if it is construed individualistically, epistemic justification does not capture the conditions that philosophers of science would impose on justified belief in a scientific hypothesis. The difficulty arises from beliefs acquired through testimony. From this I derive a lesson that epistemologists generally, and epistemologists of testimony in particular, should learn from philosophers of science: we ought to repudiate epistemic individualism and move towards a more fully social epistemology.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)12541-12559
Number of pages19
JournalSynthese
Volume199
Issue number5-6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2021

Keywords

  • Epistemology of testimony
  • Evidence
  • Philosophy of science
  • Reliance
  • Social epistemology
  • Testimony

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences(all)

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