What epistemologists of testimony should learn from philosophers of science

Sanford C. Goldberg

doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03342-x

What epistemologists of testimony should learn from philosophers of science

Sanford C. Goldberg^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that, if it is construed individualistically, epistemic justification does not capture the conditions that philosophers of science would impose on justified belief in a scientific hypothesis. The difficulty arises from beliefs acquired through testimony. From this I derive a lesson that epistemologists generally, and epistemologists of testimony in particular, should learn from philosophers of science: we ought to repudiate epistemic individualism and move towards a more fully social epistemology.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	12541-12559
Number of pages	19
Journal	Synthese
Volume	199
Issue number	5-6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03342-x
State	Published - Dec 2021

Keywords

Epistemology of testimony
Evidence
Philosophy of science
Reliance
Social epistemology
Testimony

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy
Social Sciences(all)

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10.1007/s11229-021-03342-x

Cite this

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abstract = "The thesis of this paper is that, if it is construed individualistically, epistemic justification does not capture the conditions that philosophers of science would impose on justified belief in a scientific hypothesis. The difficulty arises from beliefs acquired through testimony. From this I derive a lesson that epistemologists generally, and epistemologists of testimony in particular, should learn from philosophers of science: we ought to repudiate epistemic individualism and move towards a more fully social epistemology.",

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What epistemologists of testimony should learn from philosophers of science

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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