What luck is not

Jennifer Lackey*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

67 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, I critically examine the two dominant views of the concept of luck in the current literature: lack of control accounts and modal accounts. In particular, I argue that the conditions proposed by such viewsthat is, a lack of control and the absence of counterfactual robustnessare neither necessary nor sufficient for an event's being lucky. Hence, I conclude that the two main accounts in the current literature both fail to capture what is distinctive of, and central to, the concept of luck.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)255-267
Number of pages13
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume86
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2008

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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