What the metasemantics of know is not

Peter van Elswyk*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Epistemic contextualism in the style of Lewis (in Aust J Philos 74:549–567, 1996) maintains that ascriptions of knowledge to a subject vary in truth with the alternatives that can be eliminated by the subject’s evidence in a context. Schaffer (in Philos Stud 119:73–103, 2004, in Oxford Stud Epistemol 1:235–271, 2005, in Philos Phenomenol Res 75:383–403, 2007, in Philos Issues 18(1):1–19, 2008, in: Schaffer, Loewer (eds) A companion to David Lewis, pp 473–490. Wiley, Hoboken, 2015), Schaffer and Knobe (in Noûs 46:675–708, 2012), and Schaffer and Szabó (in Philos Stud 168(2):491–543, 2014) hold that the question under discussion or qud always determines these alternatives in a context. This paper shows that the qud does not perform such a role for know and uses this result to draw a few lessons about the metasemantics of context-sensitivity.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)69-82
Number of pages14
JournalLinguistics and Philosophy
Volume43
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2020

Keywords

  • Contrastivism
  • Epistemic contextualism
  • Knowledge
  • Metasemantics
  • Question under discussion
  • qud

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Linguistics and Language

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'What the metasemantics of know is not'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this