Abstract
Do news organizations purposefully lead the public to support a particular ideological agenda? When debating this question, many analysts draw conclusions from weak empirical evidence. We introduce a model that clarifies how a news organization's internal structure combines with market forces to affect when it can lead public opinion. We identify conditions under which liberal reporters or politically-driven media magnates can achieve ideological goals. We also illuminate important barriers that prevent many would-be public opinion leaders from ever satisfying these conditions. We show that internal structure and market forces are critical determinants of any news organization's power over public opinion.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 127-155 |
| Number of pages | 29 |
| Journal | Public Choice |
| Volume | 113 |
| Issue number | 1-2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2002 |
Funding
∗ We thank James Alt, Kathleen Bawn, Virginia Chanley, Gary Cox, Nicole Druckman, John Freeman, Elisabeth Gerber, Peter Gourevitch, Tim Groeling, Daniel Hallin, Shanto Iyengar, Gary King, James Kuklinski, Rebecca Morton, Jonathan Nagler, Scott Page, Michael Schudson, Joel Sobel, Michael Thies, John Zaller and seminar participants at Harvard University, Michigan State University, UC Berkeley, UCLA, and UC San Diego for helpful comments. Professor Druckman also acknowledges support from the Office of the Vice President for Research and Dean of the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, and Professor Lupia acknowledges the support of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Economics and Econometrics