When Do Outsider CEOs Generate Strategic Change? The Enabling Role of Corporate Stability

Ayse Karaevli*, Edward J. Zajac

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

54 Scopus citations

Abstract

When academic researchers, business commentators, and boards of directors have debated the merits of hiring new CEOs from outside the firm, the implicit or explicit assumption typically made is that outsider CEOs will provide an advantage in achieving strategic change. In this study, we challenge this assumption by employing a duality perspective on stability/change, and we provide an original conceptual framework to posit that it is the presence of corporate stability (ordinary succession, a long-tenured predecessor CEO, and good firm performance) that allows outsider CEOs to generate a greater degree of post-succession strategic change. We use extensive longitudinal data from US airline and chemical industries between 1972 and 2010 to test our hypotheses, and we discuss how our supportive findings challenge long-standing assumptions regarding the outsider succession-strategic change relationship, and we advocate embracing the non-intiutive notion that stable (unstable) conditions can be enablers (barriers) of strategic change for outsider CEOs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1267-1294
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Management Studies
Volume50
Issue number7
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2013

Keywords

  • CEO successions
  • Outsider CEOs
  • Strategic change
  • Strategic leadership
  • Successor origin

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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