When does restricting your opponent's freedom hurt you?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I examine the payoff consequences for a player when she removes a subset of her opponent's actions before playing a two-player complete information normal form game. When she faces a constraint on the maximal number of actions she can remove, she can be strictly better off by not removing any actions. I present such an example. I also establish sufficient conditions under which removing opponent's actions cannot hurt. As a corollary, I also characterize a necessary condition for a player's optimal Nash Equilibrium in games with generic payoffs when her opponent has strictly more actions than she does.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)234-239
Number of pages6
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - Nov 1 2016


  • Carathéodory's Theorem
  • Normal form game
  • Restricting freedom

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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