Why animalism matters

Andrew M. Bailey; Allison Krile Thornton; Peter van Elswyk

doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01593-x

Why animalism matters

Andrew M. Bailey^*, Allison Krile Thornton, Peter van Elswyk

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Here is a question as intriguing as it is brief: what are we? The animalist’s answer is equal in brevity: we are animals. This stark formulation of the animalist slogan distances it from nearby claims—that we are essentially animals, for example, or that we have purely biological criteria of identity over time. Is the animalist slogan—unburdened by modal or criterial commitments—still interesting, though? Or has it lost its bite? In this article we address such questions by presenting a positive case for the importance of animalism and applying that case to recent critiques.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	2929-2942
Number of pages	14
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	178
Issue number	9
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01593-x
State	Published - Sep 2021

Keywords

Animalism
Personal identity
Personal ontology
What are we?

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

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10.1007/s11098-020-01593-x

Cite this

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abstract = "Here is a question as intriguing as it is brief: what are we? The animalist{\textquoteright}s answer is equal in brevity: we are animals. This stark formulation of the animalist slogan distances it from nearby claims—that we are essentially animals, for example, or that we have purely biological criteria of identity over time. Is the animalist slogan—unburdened by modal or criterial commitments—still interesting, though? Or has it lost its bite? In this article we address such questions by presenting a positive case for the importance of animalism and applying that case to recent critiques.",

keywords = "Animalism, Personal identity, Personal ontology, What are we?",

author = "Bailey, {Andrew M.} and Thornton, {Allison Krile} and {van Elswyk}, Peter",

note = "Funding Information: Funding was provided by National University of Singapore (Grant No. FY2020-FRC1-008). Funding Information: Thanks to an anonymous referee and Brad Rettler for comments and to Matt Duncan for helpful conversation prior to the writing of this article. Funding from Yale-NUS College and the Singapore Ministry of Education supported this research. Co-authorship is equal. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.",

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AU - van Elswyk, Peter

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Y1 - 2021/9

N2 - Here is a question as intriguing as it is brief: what are we? The animalist’s answer is equal in brevity: we are animals. This stark formulation of the animalist slogan distances it from nearby claims—that we are essentially animals, for example, or that we have purely biological criteria of identity over time. Is the animalist slogan—unburdened by modal or criterial commitments—still interesting, though? Or has it lost its bite? In this article we address such questions by presenting a positive case for the importance of animalism and applying that case to recent critiques.

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KW - Personal ontology

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Why animalism matters

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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