Abstract
Safer firms receive funding from reputable venture capitalists and offer new securities underwritten by reputable investment banks. We offer a new explanation for these facts employing a moral-hazard model in which a firm and an agent are matched endogenously. More reputable agent's effort has a greater impact on output. Safer firm's output reflects the agent's hidden effort more accurately and therefore the agent's pay scheme tied with the output powerfully motivates her to exert effort. In equilibrium, a safer firm should be matched with a reputable agent since this combination allows to maximize effort of the reputable agent.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2-12 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Finance Research Letters |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 2009 |
Keywords
- Matching
- Moral hazard
- Project risks
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance